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Fuentes, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Martin Roman was convicted of indecent assault and 
corruption of a minor, both crimes involving his daughter, 
and is currently a prisoner of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections.  As part of his sentence, the State of 
Pennsylvania recommended that Roman participate in a sex 
offender treatment program.  In order to do so, he is required 
to admit that he committed the sex crime for which he was 
convicted.  Roman has refused to participate in the program 
because, he contends, any such admission would constitute 
compelled self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment and would have compromised his then-pending 
appeal of his sex offense conviction.  Based on his refusal to 
participate, Roman repeatedly has been denied parole.  The 
primary issue before us is whether the State‟s decision to 
deny Roman parole, unless he admits his guilt and 
participates in the sex offender treatment program, violates 
his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.  We 
hold that it does not. 
I. 
 In 1977 a jury found Roman guilty of two counts of 
third-degree murder.  He received an aggregate sentence of 
15-30 years.  Roman was released on parole in 1992, shortly 
after his minimum release date.  Eight years later, while still 
on parole for the homicide conviction, Roman was accused of 
inappropriately touching his six-year-old daughter.  He was 
charged with endangering the welfare of a child, corruption of 
a minor, unlawful restraint, simple assault, recklessly 
endangering another person, false imprisonment, and indecent 
assault.    
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 Ultimately, Roman was convicted of indecent assault 
and corruption of a minor in 2001, and was sentenced to serve 
16-32 months in a state correctional facility, to be followed 
by two years‟ probation.  The sentencing report recommended 
that he serve his sentence at a facility offering treatment for 
“Sexual Offenders and Abusers.”   
 Following Roman‟s 2001 conviction, the Pennsylvania 
Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) met and 
determined that Roman‟s conduct violated the terms of his 
parole from his homicide conviction.  The Board ordered him 
to serve backtime and the remainder of his sentence for 
murder, pending parole, prior to beginning his sentence for 
his 2001 conviction.  The Board‟s decision stated that, 
“[w]hile confined, [Roman] must comply with the 
institution‟s prescriptive program requirements and have no 
misconducts.  [Roman] must participate in sex offender 
treatment.”  (App. 74.)  Pennsylvania‟s sex offender treatment 
program requires that an inmate admit guilt for the offending 
conduct in order to participate.  Roman says that he refused to 
participate because admitting his guilt could have jeopardized 
his then-pending appeal of his conviction for indecent assault 
and corruption of minors.  
 The Board first denied Roman parole in August 2003, 
following a hearing.  In its decision, the Board considered 
Roman‟s version of the nature and circumstances surrounding 
his homicide offense,
1
 his prior history of parole failure, and 
his unacceptable compliance with the sex offender treatment 
                                              
1
 It appears from the record that Roman continued to maintain 
that the homicides for which he was convicted in 1977 were 
acts of self-defense. 
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program prescribed to him in his sentencing.  The Board 
stated that in Roman‟s next review it would consider 
“whether [Roman had] participated in/successfully completed 
a treatment program for: sex offenders” and whether prison 
officials still recommended him for parole.  (App. 84.) 
 The Board denied Roman parole a second time in 
August 2004, citing the same factors it relied on in its 2003 
decision.  It again listed Roman‟s failure to complete the 
prison sex offenders program as one of the bases for its 
decision, and again stated that it would consider whether he 
had completed the program as part of its next review of his 
eligibility for parole. 
 Roman sought review of these parole denials in the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, requesting a writ of 
mandamus directing the Board to “correct [its] misapplication 
of the law.”  (App. 88.)  The Court dismissed his petition, 
finding that the Board had acted within the scope of its 
discretion.  Roman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and 
Parole, No. 682 M.D. 2004 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 13, 2004).  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that decision the 
following year.  Roman v. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 
881 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2005).  Roman did not assert a Fifth 
Amendment claim during either of those proceedings. 
 In November 2005, Roman filed a pro se petition for 
habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing 
that the Board “violate[d the] constitutional . . . protections of 
the ex post facto clause when it ordered Mr. Roman to 
participate in a sex offender program before considering his 
parole application of the 1977 conviction in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” At the time he filed his 
petition, Roman‟s appeal of his 2001 conviction for indecent 
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 Roman‟s petition was assigned to a Magistrate Judge, 
who issued a Report and Recommendation stating that 
Roman had failed to exhaust his claims in state court, as 
required under federal habeas law.  In the alternative, he 
found that Roman‟s petition failed on the merits.  The 
Magistrate Judge interpreted Roman‟s claim as an ex post 
facto challenge and determined that, because Roman could 
not demonstrate that a change in the law governing 
Pennsylvania parole decisions had affected his sentence, his 
claim failed.   
                                              
2
  Roman‟s appeal of his 2001 state court conviction for 
indecent assault and corruption of a minor was denied in 
February 2006, rendering his conviction final.  No party has 
suggested that this renders this case moot.  Indeed, Roman 
remains incarcerated and subject to the demands of the Board.  
Assuming, arguendo, that Roman can show that the Board‟s 
actions were unconstitutional and affected the length of time 
he was required to remain incarcerated for his first sentence 
for murder, our decision here would affect the length of time 
remaining on that sentence and his release date.  DeFoy v. 
McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005); cf. United 
States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 181 (2002) (stating that an 
inmate who has been unconditionally released from prison 
must demonstrate collateral consequences continuing from 




 In response, Roman filed an objection to the 
Magistrate Judge‟s Report and Recommendation, more fully 
articulating that the conditions on his parole were problematic 
because, in order “to participate in a sex offender program, 
which requires admission of the crime as a stepping stone for 
admission [into the program],” Roman would be “require[d] . 
. . to waive his Fifth Amendment[] rights against self 
incrimination.”  (App. 13.)  Roman objected that he could not 
waive those rights because he had yet to exhaust his 
challenges to his 2001 state court conviction.  
Notwithstanding Roman‟s objections, the District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge‟s Report and Recommendation 
and denied Roman‟s habeas claim.   
 In May 2007, this Court issued a certificate of 
appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) on two issues: 
(1) “whether [Roman] ha[d] exhausted his claim that the 
denial of parole based on his failure to complete the sex 
offender treatment program violates his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination with respect to a conviction 
that is not final; and (2) if so, whether the denial of parole 
violated [Roman‟s] right against self incrimination with 
respect to the conviction that was not final.” 
II. 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Roman‟s 
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 Where, as here, a district court dismisses a habeas 
petition without first holding an evidentiary hearing, our 
review is plenary.  Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We review de novo all questions of law, and 
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consider all factual allegations in a light most favorable to the 
petitioner to determine whether he has stated a cognizable 
claim for habeas relief.  Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 
284, 291 (3d Cir. 1991).  We then determine whether an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary to develop the facts before 
us.  Id.  
III. 
A. Exhaustion Requirement 
 A federal court may not review a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus “unless it appears that . . . the applicant has 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or 
shows that doing so would be futile because state procedures 
are unavailable or ineffective.”  DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 
F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  In order to satisfy the 
futility exception to the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner 
must show that the state remedy is so “clearly foreclosed” by 
state law that we can “conclude with certainty” that state 
courts afford no recourse for the claim.  Lines v. Larkins, 208 
F.3d 153, 165, 163 (3d Cir. 2000).  Where, however, a 
petitioner has failed to raise his claims in state court and we 
find that some state process is available to address those 
claims, notions of federalism and comity require that we 
dismiss the habeas petition.  DeFoy, 393 F.3d at 442.   
 Alternatively, we may bypass the exhaustion issue 
altogether should we decide that the petitioner‟s habeas claim 
fails on the merits.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application 
for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 
notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the 
remedies available in the courts of the State.”); Taylor v. 
Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 427 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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 Roman now argues that the exhaustion requirement is 
no bar to his claim because, as this Circuit recognized in 
DeFoy, 393 F.3d 439, Pennsylvania law affords no remedy 
for claims challenging the constitutionality of a denial of 
parole.  Thus, he argues, any attempt to raise his argument in 
state court would have been futile.
 3
  In response, the State 
argues that DeFoy no longer controls because Commonwealth 
Courts since that decision have adjudicated mandamus 
actions involving parole denials by the Board and have 
considered constitutional claims other than ex post facto 
claims. 
 Because we will deny Roman‟s claims on the merits, 
we need not address the issue of exhaustion in this case.  
However, we pause to note that, to the extent there has been 
                                              
3
  In DeFoy, faced with a habeas petition similar to Roman‟s, 
a district court dismissed the petitioner‟s Fifth Amendment 
claims against the parole board as unexhausted because 
DeFoy could have first filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
in the Pennsylvania state courts.  393 F.3d at 441.  We 
reversed, reading Pennsylvania‟s case law up to that point to 
permit prisoners challenging the denial of parole to seek writs 
of mandamus, but only under the ex post facto clause, and not 
on other constitutional grounds.  See id. at 444 (quoting 
Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. 2001) (“Absent a 
change in the statutes governing parole, . . . denial of parole 
would generally constitute a discretionary matter that is not 
subject to review.”)).  Therefore, we held that “a 
Pennsylvania state prisoner challenging the denial of parole 
need not file a petition for a writ of mandamus in order to 
satisfy the dictates of exhaustion.”  Id. at 444. 
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any shift in Pennsylvania law, we cannot comfortably say that 
it is clear enough to alter our decision in DeFoy.
4
   
B.  Fifth Amendment Claim 
 The Fifth Amendment, as incorporated and made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
Though a prisoner already may have been convicted and 
imprisoned for an offense, the Fifth Amendment still applies 
to ensure that the individual not be compelled to bear witness 
against himself or to divulge information that might 
                                              
4
  The availability of Pennsylvania mandamus review for 
inmates challenging the denial of their parole on non-ex post 
facto grounds remains unsettled.  Though certain courts since 
DeFoy have demonstrated some willingness to consider 
constitutional claims outside the ex post facto context, none 
have addressed or acknowledged the language that drove our 
reading of Coady.  See Nieves v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
995 A.2d 412, 418 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (substantive due 
process and ex post facto); Wilson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 
Parole, 942 A.2d 270 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2008) (Fifth 
Amendment in context of sexual offender rehabilitation 
program); Dodgson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 922 A.2d 
1023, 1026 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (due process, equal 
protection, Fifth Amendment, court access and ex post facto); 
Nickson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 880 A.2d 21, 13 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2005) (Eighth Amendment).  But see Nieves, 
995 A.2d at 421-22 (Leavitt, J., concurring) (citing Coady for 
the proposition that “mandamus will not lie” in challenges to 
the denial of parole and arguing that the court need not have 
considered the claims before it at all). 
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incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984).  An individual trying to 
make out a Fifth Amendment claim must demonstrate two 
key elements: compulsion and use.  Id. 
 Roman argues that the Board‟s decisions requiring that 
he participate in the sex offender rehabilitation program 
violated his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment, since the Board effectively compelled him to 
choose between admitting his guilt for a sexual offense—a 
requirement for admission to the program—and relinquishing 
his opportunity for parole.  Roman further argues that, at the 
time he filed this petition, his conviction for the sex offense 
was not yet final and thus any admission he made could be 
used against him in that appeal or in any future proceedings.  
The State responds that Roman has not demonstrated a Fifth 
Amendment violation because the consequences of his refusal 
to participate in the program are not severe enough to 
constitute compulsion under the Fifth Amendment.  Further, 
it argues that Roman is unable to show that his statements 
were or would have been used against him in a criminal 
proceeding, had he decided to participate in the program.  
 The record before us is not clear as to the extent to 
which Roman‟s refusal to participate in the program was the 
sole or primary cause of the Board‟s repeated refusal to grant 
him parole.  In each Board letter, it is listed as one among 
several reasons for denying him parole, including his history 
of previous failures under supervised release.   However, even 
assuming arguendo that the Board‟s refusal was the sole 
driver of its decisions to refuse Roman parole, we hold that 
the actions of the Board do not amount to “compulsion” 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
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 Though the privilege against self-incrimination “does 
not terminate at the jailhouse door,” it is well established that 
a “broad range of choices that might infringe constitutional 
rights in a free society fall within the expected conditions of 
confinement of those who have suffered a lawful conviction.”  
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (plurality opinion) 
(Kennedy, J.).  Thus, in circumstances such as these, where a 
prisoner‟s liberties are already curtailed as a necessary and 
essential element of his incarceration, that prisoner faces 
unique challenges in demonstrating that a particular penalty 
or punishment inflicts a constitutional injury upon him.  In the 
context of the Fifth Amendment, specifically, compulsion is 
the linchpin of any such claim.  
 Where, as here, a prisoner argues that the 
consequences of his refusal to participate in a prison program 
that requires him to admit guilt violate the Fifth Amendment, 
we must ask “whether the State‟s program, and the 
consequences for non-participation in it, combine to create a 
compulsion that encumbers” that prisoner‟s right against self-
incrimination.  Id. at 35.  Though drawing the distinction 
between a lawful condition of confinement and a condition 
that impermissibly encumbers a prisoner‟s rights can be 
challenging, it is a distinction that rests on the difference 
between merely pressuring or encouraging an inmate to 
incriminate himself, and compelling him to do so through the 
threat of consequences so “grave” as to leave him no choice 
at all.  See id. at 50 (O‟Connor, J., concurring). 
 The Supreme Court outlined the contours of this 
analysis in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).  In that case 
Lile, a convicted sex offender, brought a Fifth Amendment 
challenge to Kansas‟ compulsory sex offender program, 
which required him to admit guilt for his crime of 
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incarceration as well as any previous sex crimes.  Id. at 29.  
Under the Kansas program, any such admissions were not 
privileged and could be used in future criminal proceedings.  
Id. at 30.  Lile, who was convicted of rape but had maintained 
all along that the encounter was consensual, refused to admit 
guilt and faced losing substantial prison privileges as a result.  
In particular, prison officials threatened to restrict his 
visitation rights, earnings, prison job opportunities, and 
ability to send money to his family.  Lile was also told he 
would be moved to a maximum-security prison, which 
necessarily entailed less comfortable living conditions and 
housed more dangerous inmates, in order to make room for 
prisoners who were willing to participate in the program.  Id. 
at 30-31. 
 In a fractured opinion, a plurality of the Court agreed 
that Lile—though faced with a difficult choice between 
asserting his right to remain silent and receiving the benefits 
and comforts of the prison conditions then afforded to him—
had failed to demonstrate that the reduction in his prison 
privileges rose to the level of compulsion proscribed under 
the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 46-48.  The plurality opinion, 
authored by Justice Kennedy, distinguished the punishment 
meted against Lile from the “so-called penalty cases” in 
which the Court had previously held that consequences 
involving the loss of employment or professional reputation 
were sufficient to constitute compulsion under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Those cases, the plurality wrote, involved free 
citizens, not already subject to the limitations of prison life, 
and were thus “not easily extended to the prison context.”  Id. 
at 40 (citing Garity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); 
Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967)).  Instead, the 
plurality applied a very stringent test that required that the 
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inmate demonstrate the imposition of “atypical and 
significant hardships on [inmates] in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.” Id. at 37 (adopting the test for due 
process claims established in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 
(1995)).  In effect, the plurality‟s test limited compulsion to 
instances not served by a legitimate penal interest, where the 
punishment actually lengthened a prisoner‟s sentence or 
altogether denied him eligibility for good-time credits or 
parole.  Id.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented, urging that the Court adopt a 
much broader test which recognized that the threat of 
revoking privileges was sufficient to trigger the Fifth 
Amendment, absent some grant of immunity assuring that the 
statements could not be used against the prisoner.  McKune, 
536 U.S. at 59, 69-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 Justice O‟Connor, whose opinion controls,5 concurred 
on narrow grounds, agreeing with the plurality‟s judgment 
that Lile‟s Fifth Amendment claim failed but agreeing with 
the dissent that “the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is 
broader than the „atypical and significant hardship‟ standard 
[the Court had] adopted for evaluating due process claims in 
prisons.”  Id. at 48 (O‟Connor, J., concurring). 
                                              
5
 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); see also 
United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(When “no one view garners a majority of the Justices . . . the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 




 Justice O‟Connor did not, herself, state a particular test 
for determining what degree of penalty amounts to 
compulsion in the prison context. She noted, however, that a 
proper inquiry should “recognize that it is generally 
acceptable to impose the risk of punishment, however great, 
so long as the actual imposition of such punishment is 
accomplished through a fair criminal process” and so long as 
it stops short of punishments such as “longer incarceration or 
execution”—penalties that “would surely implicate a „liberty 
interest.‟”  Id. at 53, 52 (citing McGautha v. California, 482 
U.S. 183, 213 (1971)).  Importantly, under Justice 
O‟Connor‟s analysis, the “Fifth Amendment does not prohibit 
all penalties levied in response to a person‟s refusal to 
incriminate himself or herself . . . . Not all pressure 
necessarily „compels‟ incriminating statements.”  Id. at 49; 
see also Ohio v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 286 (1998) (noting 
in the context of voluntary clemency hearings that “it has 
never been suggested that such pressures constitute 
„compulsion‟ for Fifth Amendment purposes”); McGautha, 
402 U.S. at 213 (noting that a criminal defendant is often 
faced with “the making of difficult judgments as to which 
course to follow” but that “the Constitution does not . . . 
always forbid requiring him to choose”).  
 Though the prison in McKune threatened to restrict 
Lile‟s privileges and transfer him to less comfortable 
accommodations, Justice O‟Connor found it instructive that 
he would still be provided with basic necessities—food and 
shelter, and would still “retain[] the ability to see his attorney, 
his family, and members of the clergy.”  McKune, 536 U.S. at 
51.  Nor had Lile shown that the consequences of his refusal 
to incriminate himself were more restrictive than the same 
sanctions applied to discipline any inmates who refused to 
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comply with any number of prison requirements, or that that 
the transfer to another prison would result in bodily harm.  Id.  
Instead, because Lile‟s confinement already, by definition, 
subjected him to such conditions, the consequences of his 
refusal to speak were punishments within the scope of his 
conviction, rather than “stark[] . . . government attempts to 
compel testimony.”  Id. at 53; see also id. at 50 
(distinguishing penalties imposed upon Lile from the more 
severe penalties inflicted on individuals outside the context of 
the prison environment).  
 There is no precedent in our Circuit that interprets or 
applies McKune, or that governs the case before us.  Since 
McKune, several of our sister circuits have confronted cases 
similar to the one at hand, and have faced the challenge of 
interpreting and applying that decision to the facts before 
them.  However, to the extent these circuits have attempted to 
articulate a standard that governs these cases, the results have 
been varied.
6
  In Ainsworth v. Stanley, the First Circuit, 
noting that McKune provided “no clear guideposts,” 
“resort[ed] to [its] own sound judgment” in denying the Fifth 
Amendment claim before it.  317 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002).  
The court adopted its own pre-McKune test, which it found 
consistent with that decision, and evaluated whether the 
burden imposed by the sex offender treatment program was 
                                              
6
 Notably, some have taken McKune at face value, relying on 
factual comparisons alone in reaching a conclusion.  See, e.g., 
Reed v. McKune, 298 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2002) (relying 
solely on comparison with facts in McKune in dismissing a 
similar case levied against the same rehabilitation program 
evaluated in McKune); Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220 
(10th Cir. 2002) (same). 
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“unreasonable” in light of the state‟s interest and the 
availability of other, less burdensome means of achieving that 
interest.  Id. at 5 (dismissing Fifth Amendment claim 
involving New Hampshire‟s sex offender treatment program).  
In contrast, in United States v. Antelope, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that “the status of the person claiming the Fifth 
Amendment privilege” or the “severity of the penalty 
imposed” are not, alone, determinative.  395 F.3d 1128, 1137 
(9th Cir. 2005).  Instead, it placed a premium on the state‟s 
purpose in imposing the penalty and on the extent to which 
the penalty went beyond that already imposed by fair criminal 
process.  Id. at 1137 (finding Fifth Amendment violation 
where District Court actually lengthened term of 
probationer‟s supervised release based on his refusal to 
submit to repeat polygraph tests asking whether he had 
engaged in prohibited sexual conduct).   
 Thus, in light of the lack of clear consensus from other 
circuits and because Justice O‟Connor‟s controlling opinion 
in McKune stops short of articulating its own test, we are 
tasked with the responsibility of distilling the core principles 
of that decision.  To that end, we note that three things are 
abundantly clear:  
 First, a state program that requires an inmate to 
incriminate himself solely for the purposes of gathering 
incriminating statements against him will not pass 
constitutional muster.  While the conditions inherent to 
imprisonment may alter our definition and application of 
“compulsion” under the Fifth Amendment, a state wielding its 
control over an inmate solely as “mere subterfuge for the 
conduct of a criminal investigation,”  is the very sort of 
conduct that the Fifth Amendment is intended to prohibit.  
McKune, 536 U.S. at 34; id. at 41 (discussing “elaborate 
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attempt” to avoid Fifth Amendment protections); id. at 53 
(O‟Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing Kansas‟ program 
from “stark[] . . . government attempts to compel testimony”); 
id. at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (conceding that the state‟s 
interest in rehabilitation is persuasive, but arguing that the 
state‟s need does not justify overriding Fifth Amendment 
protections).  Thus, the statement sought—whether the inmate 
decides to speak or to remain silent—must be tethered to 
some independent, legitimate state purpose, such as 
rehabilitating inmates convicted of certain crimes.  The more 
attenuated the relationship between the two, the greater our 
concern that the penalty is indicative of a state attempt to 
wield its power in an impermissible manner.  
 Second, it is undisputed by the plurality, the 
concurrence and the dissent that, in the event the penalty 
imposed does amount to an atypical and significant hardship 
on the petitioner‟s prison conditions, that penalty is 
sufficiently compelling to constitute a Fifth Amendment 
violation.  While the plurality opinion treats this standard as 
the minimum showing necessary under the Fifth Amendment, 
id. at 37, both Justice O‟Connor and the dissent advocate for a 
more flexible, permissive standard, albeit to varying degrees.  
Id. at 48-49 (O‟Connor, J., concurring);  id. at 59, 69-70 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  It thus stands to reason that a 
prisoner who demonstrates that the consequences of his 
refusal to incriminate himself inflict an atypical and 
significant hardship on the conditions of his incarceration has 
made a sufficient, though not a necessary, showing under the 
Fifth Amendment.    
 Third, and relatedly, in light of Justice O‟Connor‟s 
opinion, it is clear that there exists some realm of penalties 
just short of those that amount to atypical and significant 
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hardships, which, given the context, are sufficient to 
constitute compulsion.  The distinction between an 
impermissible penalty and a mere consequence requires that 
we examine the penalty assessed in light of the conditions and 
restrictions already incumbent on the confinement itself.  Id. 
at 51 (O‟Connor, J., concurring). 
 Thus, under McKune, those penalties that merely alter 
the degree of comfort or freedom that an inmate is afforded, 
within the context of his confinement, but that otherwise 
remain within the permissible bounds of the inmate‟s 
prescribed sentence, are differences in measure alone and thus 
do not amount to compulsion under the Fifth Amendment.  
See id. at 51-54.  In contrast, penalties that go beyond the 
mere “unpleasant” and are different in kind than those 
conditions of confinement imposed on all prisoners—that 
strike at the core of an inmate‟s recognized entitlements, that 
threaten his bodily safety, or that impose additional 
punishment beyond that already imposed by fair judicial 
process—constitute impermissible compulsion under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Id. at 51. 
 In light of this analysis, Roman‟s Fifth Amendment 
claim fails because the consequence he faces—the repeat 
denial of parole for refusing to participate in the sex offender 
rehabilitation program—does not rise to the level of 
compulsion necessary to violate the Fifth Amendment.  
 Roman has no right or entitlement to parole under 
Pennsylvania law.  Commonwealth v. Brittingham, 275 A.2d 
83, 85 (Pa. 1971).  His sentence has not been lengthened, nor 
have the actual conditions of his imprisonment been altered.  
Cf. Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1138 (finding it determinative that 
defendant was “sentenced to a longer prison term for refusing 
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to comply with [the rehabilitation program‟s] disclosure 
requirements”).  At most and reading the facts he has plead in 
his favor, Roman—in deciding to assert his right to remain 
silent and thereby refusing to participate in the sex offender 
rehabilitation program—has forfeited his opportunity for 
early release on his 1971 murder sentence, the terms of which 
were imposed following full and fair criminal proceedings.  
See McKune, 536 U.S. at 53 (O‟Connor, J., concurring); 
Searcy, 299 F.3d at 1226 (describing loss of good-time 
credits, which are permissive but not guaranteed, as a loss of 
an “opportunity” for early release); see also Ohio v. 
Woodward, 523 U.S. at 286-88 (“It is difficult to see how a 
voluntary interview could „compel‟ respondent to speak . . . . 
[The] pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance 
of being granted clemency does not make the interview 
compelled.”).  Nor is the penalty itself unique in its nature or 
severity:  An inmate in Pennsylvania may be denied parole 
for many forms of misbehavior or violation of prison policies, 
all of which are designed to ensure order in the prison or to 
further the state‟s legitimate interest in rehabilitation.  See 
McKune, 536 U.S. at 52 (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (drawing 
a distinction between typical sanctions and those sanctions so 
unique as to arise to a higher level of coercion).   
 Moreover, the nature of the penalty in this case is in no 
way suggestive of the “stark[] . . . government attempts to 
compel testimony” relied on by previous cases in fleshing out 
the scope of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 53.  Though the 
Board refused Roman parole, that consequence flowed 
naturally from his decision not to participate in an established 
prison program designed to further Pennsylvania‟s legitimate 
interest in rehabilitating inmates, such as Roman, who have 
been convicted of sexual offenses.  Id.; see also id. at 37-38 
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(Kennedy, J.) (discussing state‟s legitimate interest in 
compelling inmate participation in rehabilitative programs); 
Ainsworth v. Stanley, 317 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002) (same).  
Whether we view the Board‟s focus on Roman‟s participation 
in the program as a measure of his fitness for parole, or as a 
condition of parole, it stands to reason that a state may offer 
an incentive for participation in such rehabilitative 
programs—here, the opportunity for early release—without 
obligating itself to reward an inmate who chooses not to 
participate because he considers that reward outweighed by 
the cost.  Cf. Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1080 (7th Cir. 
2003) (noting, in context of similar § 1983 claim that 
prisoners can refuse to participate in the treatment program, 
and that “[t]his may make it harder to show that their 
problems are behind them, that release is in order, and that the 
criminal charges should be dismissed, but this does not make 
the choice any less willing or intelligent” (citing United States 
v. Klotz, 943 F.2d 707, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1991))). 
 While we do not dispute that Roman was, in this case, 
presented with an exceedingly difficult choice, the law is 
clear that it is a choice he may be forced to make.  We 
therefore hold that Roman‟s Fifth Amendment claim fails on 
the merits. 
IV.  
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s order dismissing Roman‟s habeas petition.  
